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The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in an increased level of cooperation between government agencies in spite of the fact that no codified congressional legislation has directed cooperation. The Department of Defense has taken the lead in a majority of recent conflicts, however, the core competencies of other federal agencies have not been fully realized and not brought to bear. Pacification operations in Vietnam, the failed American hostage rescue attempt in Iran and the difficult civil-military integration of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Operation Iraqi Freedom highlight the challenges and inherent need for the U.S. government to implement legislation focused on the interagency process. Legislation in three strategic focus areas must be addressed in order to instill the joint cooperation necessary to solve complex challenges in the future. First, the interagency lacks a doctrine that has proven its utility in joint military operations. Second, agencies use regional structures to organize their policies and operations in an inconsistent manner. Finally, personnel policies are focused towards the development of their own agencies rather than the interagency community as a whole. Legislation similar to that, which forced the military to integrate, would ensure interagency cooperation and efficiency and success in planning and executing the U.S. national security strategy.
SUBJECT TERMS
Operational Art, Interagency, National Security Corps and the 24 th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Haiti and began humanitarian and relief operations. Immediately, the U.S. military recognized the need for civilian experts in economic, reconstruction and relief operations and sought assistance from the interagency and United Nations, however, neither the Aristide government nor the interagency or United Nations could be hurried. Civilian aid organizations and U.S. agencies could not support the increasing demands for food and medical relief, local policing functions broke down and rebuilding efforts from the chaos were almost non-existent. The military bore the brunt of the relief efforts in spite of the recognized interagency demands before the operation. Operation Uphold Democracy was ultimately a success in military terms, however, the military could not compensate for the lack of support and experience from non-Defense agencies and organizations.
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The security challenges facing the nation today are increasingly complex and not unlike the state of affairs in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. The prospect of the United
States taking unilateral military action in the future however is becoming increasingly unlikely and operations over the last fifteen years confirm this. During the Kurdish crisis in 1991 in northern Iraq, twenty-eight non-governmental organizations, including Doctors without Borders, Save the Children and U.S. Agency for International Development were involved in providing humanitarian assistance. 4 That number grew to seventy-eight non-governmental organizations during the U.S. involvement in Somalia in 1993 and 170 non-governmental organizations in Haiti in 1994. These efforts, while individually important, were absent a higher authority and resulted in an uncoordinated approach to support the people they were sent to help.
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The Defense Department has historically taken the lead in a majority of these recent conflicts, owed primarily to its disproportionate size and funding, however the core competencies of other federal agencies have not been fully realized and not brought to bear in a unified 3 Clinton S. Bolton, Jr., Military Operations Other Than War: The Civil Military Operations Center in Operation Support [i.e., Uphold] 11 This monograph will conclude with doctrinal, regional structure and personnel policy recommendations that need to be legislatively enacted in order to achieve the synergies necessary for the U.S. to be successful in future conflict in an uncertain global environment. The challenging conditions that define the lack of interagency today bear a striking similarity to those the military experienced prior to and following Goldwater-Nichols and are the considerations worth taking into account for the uncertain future.
Interagency operations are no longer rare and are expected to be the norm in a complex and rapidly changing worldwide security environment. Every federal agency has its own unique organizational structure and no one agency is tasked to integrate the activities of the other. Each of these agencies defines their roles and responsibilities differently from the other, and while cooperation exists, there are seams and gaps owing to the lack of strategic direction and guidance from the administration and Congress. Responding to these future complex challenges requires a multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that brings to bear the many diverse skills and resources of the Federal government and other public and private organizations. 12 The National Security Act of 1947 is no longer capable of efficient or effective campaign success due to the current non-existent interagency doctrine, a fractured organizational structure, and unsound personnel policies of governmental agencies.
13 Legislation similar to that, which forced the military to integrate, would ensure interagency cooperation and efficiency and success in planning and executing the U.S. national security strategy. Therefore, the need for congressionally directed legislation mandating cooperation between agencies is paramount to the successful prosecution of current and future conflict. 13 The Act merged the Department's of War and Navy into the National Military Establishment, headed by the Secretary of Defense. The NME was renamed as the Department of Defense. The purpose was to unify the Army, Navy, and what was soon to become the Air Force into a federated structure. Aside from the military reorganization, the act established the National Security Council, a central place of coordination for national security policy in the executive branch, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S.'s first peacetime intelligence agency. The function of the council was to advise the president on domestic, foreign, and military policies so that they may cooperate more tightly and efficiently. 18 More significant to their breakdown than the lack of unity and coordination of effort, none of the programs could provide consistent security for the population they were trying to support. 16-30, 45-59. In 1961, the advisory effort on consisted of several agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development the U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of State. Each of these agencies developed and coordinated their efforts through the U.S. Embassy, however, the increase in American combat strength, made it difficult for the military and civilian agencies to cooperate due to the lack of a formal interagency coordination system. To further efforts in Vietnam, President Kennedy formed an ad hoc group of counterinsurgency experts to improve interagency coordination. Unfortunately, the group could not decide whether political or military measures deserved first priority: several argued that programs to win political loyalty had to come first because that was a requirement for establishing security while others argued it was unfeasible to win the loyalty of people who were being exploited by the Viet Cong. In addition, the departments of Defense and State were unwilling to give up any control over their respective programs in South Vietnam. These disagreements reflected uncertainty within the administration as to the nature of the threat to South Vietnam and the appropriate response. 23 The three lines of effort focused on security, winning back popular support through anticommunist efforts, and large scale pacification programs. He believed that in order to maintain public support at home, a truly large-scale civil-military effort had to be undertaken.
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam
Westmoreland agreed, and despite objections from his own staff, told Komer, "I'm not asking for the responsibility, but I believe that my headquarters could take it in stride and perhaps carry out this important function more economically and efficiently than the present complex arrangement." cooperation, chief among them are unity of effort and organization. Its well designed and executed pacification efforts coupled with the successful civil-military integration offer an example of how the varying agencies of the U.S. government can successfully work together and the critical need for the right organizational structure to be in place for future operations.
However, much like the lessons that the military had learned in Vietnam, the interagency lessons were not formalized through legislation. Following the end of the Vietnam War, the solutions developed in the CORDS program were largely forgotten and were only returned to following the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iranian Hostage Rescue
On 4 November 1979 at ten o'clock in the morning Iranian time, approximately 3,000 student demonstrators assembled in the streets outside the U.S. embassy in Tehran, stormed the walls and seized the complex. In the name of Ayatollah Khomeini, the students took sixty-six American diplomats and government employees' hostage. Iranian government officials assured their U.S. counterparts that they would do everything in their power to achieve a rapid release of the hostages, but it was Ayatollah Khomeini who would ultimately decide their fate. The stage was set for what would ultimately lead to a disastrous effort to rescue the hostages and the challenges policy makers faced not only in the Middle East, but also with its ability to conduct an operation in a joint manner. Operation Eagle Claw, the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission of the Carter Administration, highlights the lack of doctrine, cooperation and understanding inherent in joint and interagency operations.
37
The desire to become engaged in foreign affairs had waned in both public and private circles following American involvement in Vietnam. Iran was however an important ally in the region and any talk of withdrawing support for Iran made it vulnerable to communist influence. History 67, 2003, 201-216. threatened the lives of the hostages, that Carter gave his approval for military action. The mission that initially seemed so unbelievable and absurd was now seen as the only real option.
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The actual operation was designed as a complex, joint operation, but in reality was conducted as a series of independent operations. The mission was doomed from the outset, largely due to command and control doctrine. There would be no less than four commanders directly involved with the actual conduct of the operation, two from the U.S. Army, and one each Shortly thereafter, eight U.S. Navy Sea Stallions took off from the USS Nimitz followed by a telecommunications plane carrying a National Security Agency linguist who monitored Iranian radio traffic for any compromises to the operation. The decision to execute the operation had come a day earlier when the signal was given by a Delta operative and two U.S. Army Soldiers who were disguised as Irish and German business men who had spent the day conducting recons of the critical areas in Tehran. The mission began better than intended. Of the eight Sea Stallions that departed the USS Nimitz, only seven were expected to make the trip without mechanical problems, and six actually required. Equipment failure was built into the plan, however, little evidence suggests that any consideration was given to weather conditions. The first C-130 flew directly into a suspended cloud of dust. The dust caused the temperature to rise in the aircraft but otherwise proved to be more of a nuisance than a concern and the C-130s landed at the Desert One site without incident. During the flight however, the air component commander, Colonel
James Kyle knew the dust cloud, called a haboob, would cause problems for the helicopters and considered warning the approaching Sea Stallions. 47 In what was later determined to be a fateful decision, he opted against breaking radio silence to warn the helicopters and no secure communications existed between the naval and fixed wing efforts. Of the original eight helicopters destined for Desert One, only six actually made it, and of the six, five were deemed serviceable enough to continue the mission. Five helicopters for the mission was below the threshold Delta Force Commander, Colonel Charlie Beckwith deemed appropriate for the mission. The sixth and final helicopter to land had a hydraulic leak and was grounded by helicopter commander, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Seiffert. Beckwith and Seiffert were at an impasse. Beckwith, the ground component commander, refused to reduce his raiding force and Seiffert, refused to fly his airframe. After only two and a half hours of actual on ground time, the air component commander, Kyle recommended to the overall commander, Army Major General James Vaught, that the mission be aborted. Upon receiving the abort directive, a helicopter struck a C-130 causing a massive explosion and the deaths of eight service members. The remaining helicopters were abandoned and the wounded personnel and crews were evacuated on the last C-
The eight dead as well as the four functional Sea Stallions were abandoned in the Iranian
Desert, signaling an end to the disastrous mission to free the hostages. The rescue attempt was bankrupt from the beginning. There was no organization, joint or otherwise, within the government that had the capabilities to conduct such a complex raid. Until that point, government organizations rarely worked together and the six months the military and 48 Cogan, "Desert One and its Disorders," 212. CIA were given to execute the hostage recovery was entirely too short. There was no planning staff, no contingency plan, no cross service experience and no joint doctrine. The failure of Desert One resulted in the further separation of services and a renewed determination to remain separate. Fortunately, the mindset within the military was changed through forcible means when the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in 1986. The lack of a codified joint doctrine for military operations as well as the synchronization absent in civil-military efforts that highlighted the challenges of the failed rescue attempt provided the spark needed to bring the military components towards a greater unity of effort and command. The failure did not however, solve the frictions evident in the civil-military effort. Today, the need to implement legislation for the interagency is equally paramount.
Coalition Provisional Authority during Operation Iraqi Freedom
On 20 January 2003 the Department of Defense was designated the lead agency for reconstruction activities, despite the fact that the Defense Department had neither the personnel nor the expertise necessary to lead civilian reconstruction programs on its own. 50 L. Paul Bremer took over the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) from retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, which was established in the belief that the Iraqi's would have some functioning government and the occupation would be short-lived. The transition from the OHRA to the Coalition Provisional Authority was quick and ugly. Additionally, the National Security Council directed other agencies to provide personnel first to ORHA and then to CPA, but rarely pushed the agencies to comply with this policy. Upon arriving in Baghdad, Bremer announced two major steps that would prove to be the most controversial of his term. Most Iraqi officials had abandoned their posts, the Iraqi Army had deserted, and the state was bankrupt. The first was to purge some 30,000 senior Ba'ath party members from state work, and the second was to disband the Iraqi army. Bremer brought with him a number of high-quality staff members, however, frequent turnover and undefined personnel policies led to a high turnover rate and inconsistent advice and performance which led to severe discontinuity among the authority.
While intended to be a predominantly civilian organization, the authority remained heavily military as a result. Further, the organization was made up of largely senior supervisors and junior subordinates with varying backgrounds and experience in foreign affairs. Bremer rapidly established the skeleton of an organization intended to serve as a government within a government. At its peak, the authority's staff had approximately 2,000 personnel, of whom perhaps half were in the country at any one time. 51 The authority's structure was overly centralized, and Bremer was excessively burdened by the number of subordinates reporting directly to him and the variety of issues requiring his attention. The authority was built from the ground up, and every bureaucratic relationship had to be established from scratch.
The US officials relied on ideology instead of planning…They failed to either make realistic assessments… or properly prepare for the fall of the regime…Parts of these failures were military…Part were not all failures the Administration and US military planners could avoid…The fact remains, however, that the US government failed to draft a serious or effective plan for…The period of conflict termination and the creation of an effective nation building office.
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In addition to the disparate planning efforts across the US government, a cultural divide owing to the lack of a unifying training and education base across agencies was present. The varying policy views represents and highlights the inherent challenges in achieving a unity of effort the CPA faced in Iraq. Many of the differences were between the Departments of State and Defense. These differing priorities, while useful during high-level policy discussions, were and impediment to the successful direction and implementation of a coordinated US policy for postconflict operations. Post conflict resolution took on less importance for the Department of Defense than for the Department of State. For the Defense Department, the priority was to win the war. It wasn't that military planners disregarded stability operations, rather that with limited personnel, efforts were focused first and primarily to the successful prosecution of hostilities.
General Peter Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the initial invasion, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee confirmed DoD efforts by stating, "we did not want to be planning for a postwar in Iraq before we were sure we were going to win the war." 
Recommendations
As the three previous case studies have shown, in military affairs, efficiency and effectiveness are often at odds with one another. This friction is even more apparent within the interagency community. Operations between and within government agencies are no longer unique, however, the response to crisis continues to be administered in an ad hoc manner.
America has been fighting the war on terrorism for well over a decade, however, the institutional structure and interagency mechanisms remain largely unchanged from the Cold War. The challenges resident in the national security apparatus of the U.S. Government are best explained by the authors of the Project on National Security Reform. They state:
The U.S. position of world leadership, our country's prosperity and priceless freedoms, and the safety of our people are challenged not only by a profusion of new and unpredictable threats, but by the now undeniable fact that the national security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing global security environment. Today, the need for congressionally directed legislation mandating cooperation between agencies is paramount to the successful prosecution of current and future conflict. Due to the current non-existent interagency doctrine, a fractured U.S. government regional structure, and unsound personnel policies of governmental agencies, the U.S. government must organize itself to conduct future campaigns more efficiently and effectively. 61 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Washington D.C., Center for the Study of the President, 2008), i. The PNSR is a non-partisan commission that has conducted a major study over the past three years in order to determine if the national security system is still viable. Manned with an "A-list" team of policy experts, historians, and professionals, the project has produced a preliminary study, a 700 page compilation of case studies, and an extensive 800 page final report. The web page for the project can be found at: http://www.pnsr.org/.
Doctrine
In order to protect vital U.S. interests at home and abroad, all elements of national power, not just military, must be coordinated. While the concept of coordinating the efforts of numerous agencies is not novel, the interagency lacks a doctrine for interagency coordination that parallels the military's. Additionally, there is no codified higher authority solely responsible for the development of interagency doctrine, training, or education. To examine this lack of doctrine and organization, a review of governmental efforts is necessary.
In 1947, Congress established the National Security Council (NSC) with the National Security Act "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable military services and other agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security."
62 What this act didn't do was force the development of doctrine for the military or the interagency. In fact, it wasn't until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, that Congress mandated the development of joint doctrine for the military services. 63 The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides useful insights and highlights the importance and success of the core set of principles and procedures that were developed to ensure military success and offers a foundation upon which to build a doctrine for interagency cooperation. In a briefing from National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, the "unwritten doctrine" in the interagency was veiled as defend agency interests first, appear responsive to crisis second, and avoid irrevocable decisions last. 64 While not applicable to all agencies, the NDU's briefing highlights the inherent friction and culture resident in the interagency community. Unlike the military, which has doctrine and a standard approach to planning operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans. Each new administration tends to reinvent the wheel, issuing new guidance on how strategy development and planning is to be done, often overlooking the best practices of and lessons learned by its predecessors.... This ad hoc approach has thwarted institutional learning and often hindered performance.
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Their report further states that there is virtually no idea of planning or a planning culture in the interagency with the exception of the Department of Defense owning to a lack of dedicated staffs and limited political objectives. Participation and residency in a formal military staff college exercise also indicates that integrating interagency, nongovernmental, and host nation personnel into operational planning teams are considerably more challenging than current U.S.
military doctrine would recognize. 68 And without an all-encompassing doctrine for the interagency, the disparate agency cultures and values will continue to be considered ahead of the wider government good.
Regional Structure
The regional focus that agencies view the world is equally as important as the concept of operations that define their interaction. 
Personnel Policies
Lack of a single unifying regional structure also highlights another problem in the interagency process. People are the foundation upon which an agency exists. The current, near non-existent personnel policies of individual agencies offer some joint exposure, however, this is almost entirely for the benefit of the parent agency and not for the collective good of government.
In this vain, a review of the U.S. military's joint manning polices offer a useful guide for fostering and building an interagency personnel foundation. As previously written, the Goldwater-Nichols Act established personnel policies for the Department of Defense that directed the development of officers with joint experience who would form the nucleus of personnel in joint operations and foster a culture of joint cooperation. The act further directed that joint officers receive training in joint doctrine, be given favorable consideration for promotion and complete a joint assignment before being considered for flag officer rank. The personnel policies of the Defense Department have a created a joint culture that has prevailed for more than 25 years regardless of service and is the foundation upon which joint interagency personnel policies should be developed.
Experience in and knowledge of other agencies is essential for the interagency process to function effectively, yet the personnel policies of most agencies "do not promote professionalism or reward service in interagency jobs."
71 As a start, adopted interagency policies must not only promote a common culture within the interagency community, but must be seen as a positive promotion path to the senior ranks in government. There is no Joint Staff for the interagency and 
National Security Council
Offering a historical discussion and providing the legislative solutions to achieve interagency cooperation are important, however it must be managed and directed by competent authorities vested with the power to make it all work. Frederick Kagan offers the most prescient insights in discussing the structure of the national security system. "The world has changed, and the threats we face have changed, and the time has come for a fundamental reorganization of our national security apparatus. This is not a problem of personality dysfunction and it is not a product of ideology, although both have played important roles in recent failures. It is a problem of structure, of organization, and more fundamentally, of the conception of what kinds of war we are likely to have to fight and how we will fight them."
72
Personnel policies and a guiding doctrine are more likely to be followed when a single authority is vested with the power to unify agencies. The National Security Act of 1947 established the NSC as the authority to coordinate interagency efforts, however it did not task or require the NSC to develop doctrine or establish personnel policies for efficient interagency interaction. Currently, the U.S. government has a unifying authority, subordinate to the President, but senior to the agencies in the NSC. The NSC, chaired by the National Security Advisor is the existing authority to manage interagency operations and have budgetary influence for the interagency process. Empowering the NSA and staff is the most efficient and effective means to develop doctrine, organize regional structures, and implement personnel policies to meet the challenges of the future. This group would be charged with establishing strategic direction and improving the links between policy, resources, and execution. They would be charged to establish a common set of terms and references that would enable interagency participants the ability to communicate more effectively and focus their agencies' efforts towards the given missions. Once the framework for communicating is established, the group would develop an operational plan or concept for a given mission. The NSA, much like the Joint Staff, would bring together the key individuals from the disparate agencies to identify the risk and 72 Frederick W. Kagan, "Two Decades Late," The National Review, June 2008. challenges inherent in an operation, prioritize their respective agency efforts towards successful mission accomplishment and help integrate and determine how the agency's capabilities will contribute towards the national objectives.
Conclusion
The history of interagency cooperation in Vietnam, Iran and Iraq has clearly demonstrated that military power alone has not been able to achieve the aims of the U.S. government in foreign affairs. Therefore, synergizing the elements of national power through legislation is necessary to meet the demands of future conflict. "The military Services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active, intimate and continuous relationships not alone between the military services themselves but also between the military services and many other departments and agencies of Government." 73 The previous comment, written in 1947 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, the chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board to his good friend James Forrestal, the Secretary of Navy and later Secretary of Defense, was penned sixty-five years ago, yet its meaning still applies today and highlights the need for legislation aimed at correcting the deficiencies inherent in the current national security apparatus of the U.S. government. The lack of cooperation between and among federal departments and agencies is nothing new as evidenced by Mr. Eberstadt's comments in 1947. The creation of the National Security Council, directed by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947, was intended to deal with the challenges of the post World War II environment and largely succeeded. Today however, the nature of the threats and challenges facing the United States require a new approach rooted in legislation. 74 What is needed are an interagency doctrine rooted in lessons from past operations, regional alignment for the whole of government that allows agencies to operate in a common framework and personnel policies that encourage and reward thinking across agency boundaries.
The U.S. military has won many battles in its history, however, winning the wars have been eluded on a number of occasions. The current interaction of government agencies continues to fail. The interagency process is incapable of meeting these future threats due to the lack of a unifying doctrine, regional alignment, personnel policies, and an overarching structure to provide unity of command. The U.S. military will seldom, if ever, conduct operations without its interagency partners. The challenges inherent in the interagency today are similar to those the military faced prior to the Goldwater Nichols Act and legislation to correct these inefficiencies must be undertaken now.
